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ACCOMMODATING RELIGION AND LAW
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
ANDREW

J.

KING*

Ever since the United States Supreme Court incorporated the
First Amendment's Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses into the
Fourteenth Amendment and began overseeing state policy regarding
religion, scholars have pondered the relationship of law and religion.
Although religion and state are formally separated, religion has had a
profound impact on law at the level of culture. Current social policy
debates over same-sex marriage and embryonic stem cell research are
only the latest manifestation of how religious concerns can press on
public issues.
In the three contributions to this symposium that are the subject
of this comment, Professors Gildin, Taylor, and Silecchia examine
different aspects of the intersection of law and religion. In their own
ways, each asks how law can accommodate religious views and
practices. Professors Taylor and Silecchia look at law from within a
religious tradition.
Specifically, Professor Taylor looks at the
relationship of Christianity and racism in American society, and
Professor Silecchia examines the role that Catholic social thought can
play in the formation of public policy. Professor Gildin, on the other
hand, takes a position outside of any particular religion in assessing the
vulnerability of minority faiths to majority intolerance. Professor
Gildin's article grows out of the scholarly reaction to the Supreme
Court's 1990 decision in Employment Division v. Smith' (and the
subsequent limiting of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA) 2 in City of Boerne v. Flores3) that made law professors
pessimistic over the willingness of federal courts to protect civil
liberties.

* Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law.
1. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
2. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 107 Stat. 1488, 42 U.S.C. §2000bb
(1-4) (2000).
3. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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I. GILDIN

Professor Gildin approaches the relationship of religion and the
state from the side of government. In light of the decisions in Smith
and City of Boerne, rejecting the compelling state interest test,
Professor Gildin asks whether minority religions can continue to
anticipate judicial protection from burdens imposed by neutral state
legislation. 4 In an earlier article written after City of Boerne, Professor
Gildin urged the states to adopt their own versions of RFRA.5 In the
article presented in this symposium, he examines whether minority
religions can rely on state courts for similar protection. Since state
constitutions contain bills of rights supporting freedom of conscience,
the state courts are a potential guarantor of free exercise. Professor
Gildin, however, is less than sanguine about the extent to which
minorities can expect full protection for their practices.
The starting point for Professor Gildin's concern is Justice
Scalia's statement in Smith:
It may fairly be said that leaving
accommodation to the political process will place at a
relative disadvantage those religious practices that are
not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable
consequence of democratic government must be
preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law
unto itself or in which judges weigh the social
importance of all laws against the centrality of all
religious beliefs. 6
Scalia's assertion that the protection of minority religions from
the burden of general legislation must be left to the legislatures caused
concern among civil libertarians. As Professor Gildin notes, minority
religions, which lack the "political clout" to defeat legislation, will
find themselves disadvantaged.7 If the legislature is unwilling to hear
their plea, their only hope lies in the willingness of state judiciaries to
create exemptions.

4. See Gary S. Gildin, The Sanctity of Religious Liberty of Minority Faiths Under State
Constitutions: Three Hypotheses, 6 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 21 (2006).
5. Gary S. Gildin, A Blessing in Disguise: Protecting Minority Faiths Through State
Religious FreedomNon-RestorationActs, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 411 (2000).
6. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
7. Gildin, supra note 4, at 25-26.
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Professor Gildin may have overstated the likelihood of
legislatures remaining deaf to the needs of minority faiths. For
example, soon after the Smith decision, Congress enacted legislation
protecting the Native American Church's use of peyote from federal
drug laws. 8 This past term the Supreme Court upheld both the
application of RFRA to the federal government and the
constitutionality of section 3 of the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 9 RFRA's more
limited successor. In Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente
Uniao Do Vegetal,' 0 the Court let stand an injunction blocking
enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act 1 against the minority
religion, and in Cutter v. Wilkinson, 12 it upheld the application of
RLUIPA to the nation's prison system. Thus, while it is true that prior
to Smith the compelling governmental interest test gave more
protection to minority religious practices, it is not clear that since
Smith there has been a significant loss in protection. In Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,13 Justice Kennedy applied
language from Smith to closely examine the ordinance that barred
Santeria's religious practice.' 4 Moreover, even when the federal
courts used the compelling governmental interest test, it was no
guarantee of protection. In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Association,15 the Supreme Court held that the Native
American plaintiffs could not prevent the U.S. Forest Service from
16
building a road through land held sacred by the Indian tribe.
Although Professor Gildin acknowledges that minorities now seem

8. 42 U.S.C. § 1996a (1994).
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-l(a) (2000).
10. 126 S. Ct. 1211, 1225 (2006).
11. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (2000).
12. 544 U.S. 709, 725-26 (2005).
13. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
14. Id. at 542. Aside from finding that Hialeah had targeted the Church of the Lukumi,
Justice Kennedy also employed equal protection analysis to evaluate the neutrality and
generality of the legislation. Id. at 540-43.
15. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
16. Id. at 458. While
indirect coercion or penalties on free exercise ... are subject to scrutiny..
. This does not and cannot imply that incidental effects of government
programs, which may make it more difficult to practice certain religions
but which have no tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to
their religious beliefs, require government to bring forward a compelling
justification for its otherwise lawful actions.
Id. at 450-51. In fact, prior to Smith, most of the cases in which the Supreme Court invoked
strict scrutiny involved the granting of benefits.
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protected from federal legislation, he is correct to worry about state
legislation that is beyond the reach of the federal courts.
Professor Gildin finds the underlying theoretical foundation for
courts to defend minority religion in James Madison's 10th
Federalist.
Gildin observes that "our democracy relies upon . . .
limits upon the power of legislative majorities to burden the liberty of
individual conscience." 18 Gildin may be asking too much of Madison.
Madison's concern was the danger of majority control of the
government. His solution in Federalist No. 10-the encouragement of
a multiplicity of interest groups-was meant to prevent political,
religious and economic factions from coalescing into a majority party.
There is no indication, however, that Madison meant the later-adopted
First Amendment to protect minority religions from government
supervision under the police power. In fact, it is likely that Madison
and the framers of the various state religion clauses only meant to
shield conscience from coercion, not to remove all burdens on
practice. Underlying the nineteenth century's approach to religious
freedom was the belief-act dichotomy. Its explicit adoption by Justice
Waite in Reynolds v. United States 19 confirmed the view that religious
practice had always been subject to local control. 20 While twentieth
century courts have recognized the importance of ritual to many
religions, religious practices that offend local norms are still subject to
control. 21 It is this control that is Professor Gildin's central concern.
Addressing the question whether religious minorities can rely
on state courts to protect them from legislative burdens, Professor
Gildin points to an apparent paradox. In states which have adopted the
compelling governmental interest test either by judicial interpretation
or legislation, courts have refused to apply strict scrutiny to bans on
same-sex marriage. If courts are unwilling to confront legislatures that
ban same-sex marriage, then they may be reluctant to stand up for
minority religions, as well. Using same-sex marriage as a proxy for an
17. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 at 56-65 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
18. Gildin, supra note 4, at 27.
19. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
20. Id. at 164. ("Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but
was left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good
order.").
21. In dealing exclusively with Free Exercise, Gildin may have given insufficient
attention to the recent changes the Court has brought to the Establishment Clause. The
Court's abandonment of strict separation shows that the Court is willing to accommodate
religion when it comes to government aid. While such aid normally favors the major
religions, Court-mandated "neutrality" gives minority faiths equal access to governmental
assistance.
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unpopular religious practice is an intriguing idea. In addition to
abortion, same-sex marriage is one of the most emotionally charged
contemporary moral issues.
Professor Gildin starts with public opinion polling that shows
opposition towards same-sex marriage is strongest among persons with
a higher degree of religious affiliation. He posits three hypotheses on
the issue of whether a state court that has adopted the compelling
interest test would strike down legislation banning same-sex marriage.
First, he asserts that there may be no relation between the adoption of
the compelling interest test in religious matters and a ban on same-sex
marriage. If that is the case, then religious minorities who seek
protection from the majority can have confidence in the courts. The
strongest basis for this view is that there is no religious group that
makes same-sex marriage a core part of its practice. Therefore, there
may be no connection between a ban on same-sex marriage and a
threat to religious practice, even though the impetus for the ban is
religious in nature. On the other hand, it must be pointed out that prior
to the compelling interest test the Supreme Court had little difficulty
upholding the ban on Mormon polygamy
22 against the claim that
polygamy was central to Mormon religion.
The second hypothesis starts from the proposition that states
adopted the compelling governmental interest test in reaction to the
Smith decision because they considered Smith a "mistake."
Implementing strict scrutiny had less to do with their concern for
minorities and more with the status of the majority religions, If the
impetus for the compelling governmental interest test came from the
majority faiths who saw Smith as denigrating religious liberty vis Avis
other liberties, then the restoration of strict scrutiny carries only
symbolic value. In that case, strict scrutiny is not likely to offer
effective protection to the minority religions in the face of majority
opinion.
Professor Gildin states his third hypothesis in what he calls
"utilitarian terms." Professor Gildin believes this hypothesis to be
most likely. Courts will protect minorities so long as the protection
does not impose too great a cost on mainstream values (or on a court's
prestige). Thus, the compelling interest test will not provide minority
protection if the courts are asked to stand against strongly-held
majority views.

22. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878).
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If same-sex marriage is truly a proxy for minority religions,
then recent decisions by state courts on same-sex marriage bear out the
likelihood of Professor Gildin's third hypothesis. 23 In these cases the
courts backed away from protecting the gay and lesbian minority in
the face of strongly held public opinion. The courts followed Scalia's
lead in Smith and deferred to state legislative judgment and popular
referenda. Although the same-sex marriage issue does not involve a
religious minority, it is clear that a strong majority may convince the
judiciary to exercise restraint and to leave the issue with the
legislature.
Professor Gildin's general position seems correct.
The
protection that state courts will accord minorities will be tempered by
the courts' judgment as to the likely unpopularity of its decision. To
the extent that courts fear a popular backlash, they will be less likely to
draw on a rights-based jurisprudence to protect a minority. It is hard
to extrapolate from views regarding homosexual rights, however, to
the specific issue of religious minorities. In our culture, religious
minorities have a higher status than gay and lesbian groups.
Legislation that coerces or denies equal treatment to religion is at the
heart of the Supreme Court's current view of Free Exercise.
Ultimately, an unpopular minority religion may have to fall back on its
faith and not its practice. Like the Mormons after the Reynolds
decision, a subsequent change in practice can bring the
religious
24
acceptance.
it
gain
and
majority
the
with
line
into
minority

II. TAYLOR
25
Professor Taylor takes a new look at racism in America.
While the usual explanations for racism's hold on American society

23. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Robles, 1 No. 86 (N.Y. July 6, 2006) (rejecting the claim that
New York's marriage law discriminates against homosexuals); Andersen v. King County, 138
P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006) (upholding the state Defense of Marriage Act that prohibited same-sei
marriage); Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006) (upholding
a Nebraska constitutional amendment limiting marriage to heterosexual couples); Perdue v.
O'Kelley, 632 S.E.2d 110 (Ga. 2006) (rejecting a technical challenge to a constitutional
amendment banning same-sex marriage).
24.

DAVID M. O'BRIEN, ANIMAL SACRIFICE AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM:

CHURCH OF THE

LUKUMI BABALU AYE V. CITY OF HIALEAH 153, 160-61 (2004). Shortly before its victory, the
Church of the Lukumi voted to stop performing ritual animal sacrifices in public. It has
continued to flourish. Id. at 153.
25. George H. Taylor, Race, Religion and Law: The Tension Between Spirit and Its
Institutionalization,6 U. MD. L. J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 51 (2006).
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rest on economic, social or psychological theories, Professor Taylor
examines the role of religion. Starting from Professor Derrick Bell's26
provocative observation that "most racists are also Christian,
Professor Taylor looks at religion to help explain'racism's persistence.
A religious lens promises to reveal a "deeper foundation" for
understanding racism's ontological basis. Since it seems counterintuitive to blame Christianity for racism's continuation, Professor
Taylor promises an analysis that is both novel and unsettling.
The core of Professor Taylor's approach to understanding
racism is through the concept of sin. As Freeman Dyson recently
observed, Christianity "is a religion for sinners.' 2 7 Drawing on earlier
work in which Taylor used the theology of Reinhold Niebuhr to
analyze Derrick Bell's writings, he now argues that racism is rooted in
human nature. "The racist replaces God as the source of value with
self and race" and thus becomes dominated by "pride, self-love, and
self-righteousness." 28 Sin causes the racist to see differences between
people where he should see only the sameness of humanity. Racism is
thus generated by human nature in rebellion from God. This condition
drives the racist to seek justification for his beliefs in religion and
explains why the liberal hope for racial reconciliation has been
thwarted.
Professor Taylor also recognizes the paradox that while
Christianity feeds racism, it also rejects it. Moreover, the victims of
racism-the former African American slaves-remain largely
committed Christians. Professor Taylor addresses this problem by
drawing a distinction between faith and doctrine. Thus, while some
versions of Christian doctrine may give support to racism, Christian
faith repudiates it. For the African Americans who remain loyal to
Christianity, their faith gives them hope that racism can be overcome
even in the face of a theology that supported slavery and
discrimination. Thus, as Professor Taylor points out, Reverend Martin
Luther King Jr. observed in his Letterfrom Birmingham Jail that if the
white churches failed to support the civil rights movement, King
would "turn my faith to the inner spiritual church, the church
within
29
world.,
the
of
hope
the
and
ekklesia
true
the
as
church,
the
26.

Id. at 51 (citing Derrick Bell, speech at the Nat'l Black Law Journal 25th

Anniversary Conference: Racism's Religious Perspective (Nov. 18, 2005)).
27. Freeman Dyson, Religionfrom the Outside, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, June 2, 2006, at 6.
28. Taylor, supra note 25, at 56; George H. Taylor, Racism as "The Nation's Crucial
Sin": Theology and DerrickBell, 9 MICH. J. RACE & L. 269, 294 (2004).
29. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., Letter From Birmingham Jail, in WHY WE CAN'T WAIT

76, 92 (1964).
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Although Professor Taylor's discussion of Christianity's role in
racism is provocative, it is subject to some criticism.
While
antebellum Southern clergy invoked Biblical authority in defense of
slavery, it is also true, as Rodney Stark has recently pointed out, that
these apologists more often invoked secular legal arguments resting on
liberty and constitutional law. 30 In looking at the American South
Professor Taylor may have used too broad a brush in painting
Christianity's complicity. Stark finds that prior to the onset of the
slave trade, the Catholic Church had reasoned its way to the
condemnation of slavery. 31 While the economic interests behind the
slave trade were too strong for the Catholic Church to overcome, the
Church was able to make its voice heard in the crafting of the various
South American slave codes. Unlike the Catholic Church, however,
the eighteenth century Anglican church did not condemn slavery in the
English colonies. Without strong Anglican opposition to slavery or an
abiding concern for the physical condition of the slaves, the secular
authorities
in North America were free to design a less humane slave
32
system.
The form of slavery, and its racist character, that took root in
the English colonies did so with the tacit approval of the Anglican
church. Thus, the different versions of Christianity at play led to legal
differences in the various slave societies. Unfortunately for the
American colonies, the Protestant version lent itself to racism taking
root and the creation of a two-color society. In making his point,
Taylor minimizes the role of Christian groups in the abolitionist
movement. Yet, as Stark observes, "the abolitionists.., spoke almost
exclusively the language of Christian faith., 33 The fact that
Christianity provided a powerful impetus to ending slavery makes it
difficult to turn Christianity into a sufficient explanation for racism's
continuation. Furthermore, Taylor does not address the extent to
which nineteenth century racism was rooted in biological and
anthropological theories. With the abolition of slavery, racism could
34
proceed on a biological (and "scientific") basis.
An additional weakness in Professor Taylor's argument is his
reliance on Biblical literalism to make his case. While intent on
demonstrating how Christian apologists used the Bible to defend
30. RODNEY STARK, FOR THE GLORY OF GOD: How MONOTHEISM
REFORMATIONS, SCIENCE, WITCH-HUNTS, AND THE END OF SLAVERY 344-45 (2003).

31. Id. at 329-34.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 344.
34.

GEORGE M. FREDERICKSON, RACISM: A SHORT HISTORY 61-68 (2002).

LED

TO
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slavery, crediting their claim via Biblical literalism raises theological
problems. Although it is true that apologists for slavery used the
literal words of the Bible to construct a pro-slavery ideology, it does
not mean that Christianity, itself, was racist. As Rodney Stark points
out, sacred texts are subject to the interpretive work of theologians.
The Catholic theologians of the middle ages working with the same
Biblical texts reasoned that slavery was wrong. It was the mistaken
focus of the Protestant denominations on the "Word" that contributed
to Christianity's apparent support of racism. Taylor's reliance on
Biblical literalism is further undermined if the key portion of the
Hebrew Bible that Taylor uses as a proof-text-Genesis 9:25"Cursed is Canaan; a slave of slaves shall he be to his brothers"-is
interpreted as a Jewish text.35 In the rabbinic tradition the type of
person "descended" from Canaan is cursed in the sense "that from
birth the Canaanites will be steeped in the culture of slavery and not
seriously desire freedom. ' 36 Thus, just as Taylor relies on the
Christian category of sin to posit the condition of humankind, so the
Jewish tradition casts the descendants of Canaan as the type of humans
who choose subjection to others (and to anything other than the will of
God). These persons are thus not fully human since they have
37
foregone freedom of will, the essential aspect of human beings.
While Biblical terms can be used by apologists of one stripe or
another, it is a trap to say that Biblical religion-whether Christian or
Jewish-is inherently racist. It
takes an ideology to turn a Biblical text
38
racism.
for
justification
into a
Professor Taylor uses his own experience with the United Farm
Workers (UFW) to illustrate how theology can inspire a person to fight
against racism. Yet his experience also showed him the danger when
faith is transformed into doctrine and religion loses its inspiration.
Taylor links this insight to law by asking how any organization can
retain its inspiring vision without bureaucratizing the values that gave
it birth. In this part of the article, Professor Taylor draws on his
suspicion that a reliance on a legal rights strategy is not enough to
35. (Revised Standard) (these are the words of Noah).
36.

THE CHUMASH: THE STONE EDITION 45 (Nosson Scherman ed.,1993).

37. It should be noted that in Leviticus 25:39-46, the Bible gives laws for both Jewish
and non-Jewish slaves without any consideration for the slaves' connection to Canaan (and a
Jewish slave could not be descended from Canaan in any event).
38. The idea of slavery and redemption is a dominant motif in the Hebrew Bible. It
appears in other contexts: the American revolutionaries accused the British of seeking to
impose "slavery" on them; nineteenth century socialists blamed the capitalists for "enslaving"
the proletariat; and the Southern slavery apologists indicted the North for imposing "wage
slavery" on its workers.
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overcome racism. Yet, he recognizes the symbolic value that rights
have for African Americans
and their potential to call society's
39
question.
into
practices
In the last section of the article Taylor applies to law the
insights his experience with the UFW gave him. Here he explores
how the concept of civil religion imports aspects of religion into law.
Americans have developed a "faith-like" attitude towards law and their
legal institutions. Yet, as Taylor warns, this faith (which is often
caricatured as "ceremonial deism") 40 carries with it the same danger
that the confusion of faith and doctrine brings to religion. Faith that
turns into doctrine may cost an organization its inspiring vision,
turning it into a bureaucratic entity. Professor Taylor's caution about
civil religion is warranted. Organized religion in American society
best serves as a counter-cultural force that can draw on its moral
traditions to call secular society to account. It is to this role that
Professor Silecchia addressed her remarks.

II. SILECCHIA
In her talk at the symposium, Professor Silecchia examined the
role religious groups play in the process of law-making. Using
Catholic social teaching as a 4model, she explores how religion can
contribute to policy formation. From its moral base, religious groups
are especially able to present the claims of the underrepresented,
pressing the state to follow its own ideals. Professor Silecchia argues
that religions that seek to play a role in policy development must do so
as a counter-cultural force. By standing outside the political process,
religious groups can function as both advocates of social policy and
critics of the secular order. She realizes that it is only from a countercultural position that religion can influence the state without being coopted by it. Thus, religious groups must take a position that is selflimiting if they wish to influence government policy. Her argument is
similar to Alexis de Tocqueville's observation that in America,
religion "takes no direct part in the government of society" and his
warning that "the church cannot share the temporal power of the state
39. Taylor, supra note 25, at 64 (citing PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE
AND RIGHTS 154 (1991)).
40. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 716 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
41. See Lucia A. Silecchia, Faith in the Public Square: Reflections on its Role and
Limitationsfrom the Perspective of Catholic Social Teaching, 6 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION,
GENDER & CLASS 69 (2006).
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without being the object of a portion of that animosity which the latter
excites. ,42
Professor Silecchia shows how the Church's natural law
tradition necessarily puts it in a critical stance vis A vis the positivist
legal order of the modem secular state. In elaborating how the Church
can call democracy to account, she uses the example of papal
encyclicals that set forth the Church's view of social and economic
policy. The Church also serves its counter-cultural function by
educating the laity. An energized laity can press these policies on
public officials. To the extent that Catholic social thought is carried
into public policy, however, it raises concern over the influence of
religion on policy, an issue addressed by numerous scholars. 43 The
issue is whether legislators can rely on their personal religious views
in making policy. Although the American public is split on the issue
of overt reliance on religion in law making, the courts have been
vigilant in assessing legislative motive. Most recently, local school
board decisions that added "intelligent design" to the biology
curriculum prompted judicial intervention."
Professor Silecchia is correct in asserting that it is only when
legislators couch their decisions in moral terms that they can withstand
the charge of sectarianism. For example, President Bush justified his
recent veto of funding for embryonic stem cell research on nonreligious grounds although it is widely believed that the basis for his
decision was religious in nature. In his veto announcement, Bush
stated that the bill crossed "a moral boundary that our decent society
needs to respect. 45 His veto message did not implicate religion but
stated that the bill would "manipulate human life and violate human
46
dignity.,,
As long as religious doctrine can be translated into morallyneutral language, religion can play a significant role in policy-making.
This holds true for both religious figures and politicians. In his article,

42.

1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 317, 321-22 (Phillips Bradley

ed. 1945) (1835).
43.

See, e.g.,

DEMOCRACY

(2003);

MICHAEL

J. PERRY,

UNDER

GOD? RELIGIOUS

FAITH AND

LIBERAL

KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE

(1988).

44. See, e.g., Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005);
Selman v. Cobb County Sch. Dist., 390 F. Supp. 2d 1286 (N.D.Ga 2005), rev'd and
remanded, 449 F.3d 1320 (11 th Cir. 2006).
45. Charles Babington, Stem Cell Bill Gets Bush's First Veto, WASH. POST, July 20,
2006, at A4.
46. M.E. Sprengelmeyer, Stem Cell Veto Isn't End, DeGette Vows, ROCKY MOUNTAIN
NEWS (Denver, Colo.), July 20, 2006, at 4A.
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Professor Gildin uses same-sex marriage to test his theory. Although
opinion research clearly shows that persons with strong religious
views are far more likely to oppose same-sex marriage, even this issue
had to be translated into moral, sociological, or historical arguments.47
After Professor Silecchia asserts the role for Catholic social
teaching, she cautions that it would be a mistake for the Church to
spend too much of its resources on public-policy making. Silecchia
points out that religion must be careful to avoid over-reliance on law
and to avoid an alliance with any one party. Thus, Professor Silecchia
recognizes the danger when religion enters the public arena and opens
itself to the kind of attacks that arise in policy debates. Ultimately,
religion's views may be seen to rely on faith, and the public arena does
not respect arguments based on faith. Pushed to defend itself, religion
will run the danger of having to rely on a "just because I believe"
argument. Silecchia thus retreats to the position that Catholic social
thought can provide principles but not details.

IV.

CONCLUSION

In the three articles that are the subject of this comment the
authors explore different aspects of the relationship between religion
and law. In a modem secular nation with a strong religious tradition,
such as the United States, the boundary between law and religion will
necessarily be contested. This has been especially true in recent years,
as public policy debates focused on issues of family and morality. We
have seen the tension between law and religion grow as religion seeks
to influence policy, believing that government has encroached on
religion's domain. In this regard, Professor Taylor warns us that
religion may not always be a positive force for good. In the wrong
hands, religious doctrine may be twisted to support unwise social
policies. On the other hand, Professor Silecchia reminds us that
particular religious traditions can offer much to public debate if done
carefully. But no matter how cautiously religion makes its case, the
pressure of majority religious opinion in the legislatures may threaten
novel religious expression. Professor Gildin cautions us that minority
religions may be too optimistic if they rely on courts to protect them
47. See e.g., Hernandez v. Robles, 3 No. 87 3 No. 89 (N.Y. June 6, 2006). Judge Smith
interpreted New York's Domestic Relations Law of 1909 to reflect the "universal
understanding" and "rational legislative decision" that marriage applies only to opposite-sex
couples. Id. at 2, 5-8.
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from legislative encroachment. In this regard, one is reminded of
Madison's warning that "parchment barriers" are "not a sufficient
guard against those encroachments which lead to a tyrannical
concentration of all the powers of government in the same hands. 48
In the United States the protection of religion relies equally on a
normative tradition of toleration that captures Locke's insight: since
"everyone is orthodox to himself," freedom of religious expression"a concernment for the interest of men's souls"-should remain
49
outside the purview of the state.

48. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 17; THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 333, 338 (James
Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
49. John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration (William Popple trans.) (1689), in
JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 14, 17 (John Horton and Susan Mendus,
eds., 1991).
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